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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over final orders or judgments rendered in the
Utah State District Courts pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j)(1992).
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the district court rule correctly that Utah R. Civ. P. 58A does not require
Defendants to give Plaintiffs notice of the signing and entry of the order?
Because the trial court's ruling on this issue is strictly a legal conclusion,
this court should accord it no difference, and should apply a "correction of error"
standard of review. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
2. Did the district court rule correctly that Rule 4-504(4) of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration does not require Defendants to give Plaintiffs notice of the
signing or entry of the order.
Because the trial court's ruling on this issue is strictly a legal conclusion,
this court should accord it no difference, and should apply a "correction of error"
standard of review. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
3. Did the district court rule correctly that a party's failure to provide notice of
entry of order and failure to file proof of service does not toll the effective date of the
judgment until actual notice is received by the opposing party?
Because the trial court's ruling on this issue is based upon stipulated facts, those
facts are treated as conclusions of law. Zions First National Bank v. National American
Title Ins,, 749 P.2d 651, 656 (Utah 1988).

1

III. APPLICABLE STATUTES
1. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 58A. See infra Addendum.
2. Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504(4). Id.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the district court's Order denying Plaintiffs Motion for

Relief from Judgment. CR. 183. Plaintiffs made claim against the State of Utah
and the action was dismissed by stipulation, but Defendants failed to notify Plaintiffs of
the entry of the order and the question was whether this is sufficient basis for tolling the
order's effective date so that Plaintiffs may refile their complaint and a bond within the
one year statute of limitations.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
1. On January 29, 1988, David W. Rounds was killed and Dylan Rounds was

injured in an automobile collision on Utah State Route 30 in Cache County, Utah. See,
Court Record ("hereinafter CR."), 2.
2. On Monday, January 30, 1989, Plaintiffs, Janice Rounds, the surviving spouse
and Dylan Rounds, minor son of said decedent, and Dylan Rounds, in his individual
capacity, made claim against the State of Utah and the Utah Department of
Transportation for the wrongful death of David W. Rounds and for personal injuries
sustained by Dylan Rounds. CR. 2 at 1f4; CR. 138.
3. Thereafter, this action was commenced in the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, for damages sustained by Plaintiffs as a consequence of said
2

automobile collision and based on the dangerous and defective condition of said highway
and the negligent acts and omissions of agents and employees of the Defendants. CR 2.
4. The Complaint was filed in this matter on April 30, 1990. CR. 2
5. After the parties engaged in discovery, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss
the case on June 28, 1991. CR. 102.
6. The Court's Order dismissing this action without Prejudice was entered on
September 16, 1991. CR. 118.
7. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order on January 15,
1993. CR. 120.
8. Defendants filed an Opposition to said Motion on January 27, 1993. CR. 155.
9. Plaintiffs filed a Reply Memorandum on February 16, 1993. CR. 169.
10. The District Court issued a Minute Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for
Relief from Judgment or Order on February 22, 1993, stating the Motion was denied for
the reasons set forth in Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion.
CR. 179.
11. The Court's Order was entered on March 9, 1993. CR. 183.
12. Plaintiffs filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the Court's final Order on
April 5, 1993. CR. 185.
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On or about the 20th day of August, 1990, Defendants filed their Answer and
Jury Demand and thereafter filed an Amended Answer and Jury Demand. CR. 9. On or

3

about the 25th day of July, 1991, Defendants filed and served their Second Amended
Answer and Jury Demand. CR. 14.
2. Between the date this action was filed and the date it was dismissed, as
hereinafter described, both parties conducted discovery. See, CR. 41-62.
3. On or about June 28, 1991, Defendant, State of Utah, moved to dismiss this
action because Plaintiffs had "failed to file an undertaking in compliance with Utah Code
Ann. §63-30-19." CR. 102.
4. Prior to September 3, 1991, Plaintiffs' counsel communicated by telephone with
Defendants' counsel and the parties agreed, in principle, to stipulate to a dismissal of the
action without prejudice. CR. 140 at 11 9.
5. On September 3, 1991, Defendants' counsel caused to be delivered to
Plaintiffs' counsel a proposed Stipulation and Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice for
approval as to form. CR. 144. The proposed Stipulation was accompanied by a letter of
transmittal. CR. 147.
6. Plaintiffs' counsel declined to approve said proposed Stipulation and Order as
to form and, on September 4, 1991, mailed to Defendants' counsel a revised Stipulation
and Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice for his consideration and approval as to form.
CR. 148. A letter of transmittal of Plaintiffs' counsel was attached thereto. CR. 150.
7. In a letter of transmittal to Defendants' counsel as aforesaid, Plaintiffs' counsel
stated:
If you are in agreement with the changes, please present the
Order to the Court for signing and entry and provide me with
an executed copy thereof.

4

CR. 150 (emphasis added).1
8. Defendants' counsel did not, thereafter, correspond or otherwise communicate
with Plaintiffs' counsel regarding the proposed Stipulation and Order. CR. 141 at H 13.
9. Defendants' counsel did not provide a copy of a final Stipulation and Order of
Dismissal Without Prejudice to Plaintiffs' counsel prior to submitting it to the Court for
signing and entry. Id. at 11 14.
10. Defendants' counsel did not provide Plaintiffs' counsel "with an executed
copy" of the Stipulation and Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice as requested in the
letter of transmittal. Id. at H 15.
11.

Plaintiffs' counsel expected to receive a copy of the Court's Order so he

could calendar the matter to comply with the one year statute of limitations. CR. 150.
12. Defendants' counsel did not file with the Clerk of the Court and serve on
Plaintiffs' counsel or his clients a Notice of Entry of Order of Dismissal Without
Prejudice. CR. 141 at H 16.
13. The Stipulation and Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice which was mailed
by Plaintiffs' counsel to Defendants' counsel on September 4, 1991, as aforesaid, and
which bears the signatures of Defendants' counsel and the Court was signed by the judge.
The Order was entered on September 16, 1991. CR. 112.
14. Plaintiffs' counsel did not know that Defendants' counsel had signed the
Stipulation or that the Order had been signed or entered until after November 24, 1992,

1

See Addendum for a copy of this letter.
5

following inquiry by Plaintiff, Janice Rounds, as to the status of her case. CR. 142 at 11
18.
15. On December 22, 1992, Plaintiffs' counsel explained the foregoing to
Defendants' counsel and requested that he stipulate that the Order of Dismissal Without
Prejudice be vacated. Id. at 1f 19.
16. On December 24, 1992, Defendants' counsel advised Plaintiffs' counsel that
his clients would not authorize him to so stipulate. Id. at 11 20.
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' legal counsel specifically requested in his letter to Defendants' legal
counsel that Defendants' legal counsel provide him with an executed copy of the Order
of Dismissal. Mr. Orton, Plaintiffs' legal counsel, did not receive a copy of the entry of
the order. Because of this, he did not know the beginning date of the one-year statute of
limitations for filing a new complaint. Plaintiffs did not learn of the entry of the order
until it was too late to file because of the one-year statute of limitations.2 Rule 58A of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-504(4) of the Utah Code of
Administration require Defendants to give Plaintiffs' legal counsel notice of the entry of
the Order of Dismissal; therefore, the trial court's failure to grant Plaintiffs' motion
requesting relief from the Order of Dismissal under the facts of this matter

institute an

abuse of discretion. This court should remand the case to the trial court, ore
the effective date of the trial court's Order of Dismissal be November 24, 199.

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1974).
6
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the day that Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' legal counsel became aware that the Order of
Dismissal had been entered.
The District Court adopted Defendants' arguments in its ruling below.3
Defendants argued below they were under no obligation to provide notice of entry of
order or proof of service pursuant to Rules 4-504(4) and U.R.C.P. 58A because they
were not "prevailing parties". Defendants further argued that Plaintiffs' Motion was not a
proper Rule 60(b)(7) motion, that no compelling grounds justifying relief existed, and
that Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief was not timely filed.
Appellants will show that Defendants were, in fact, prevailing parties and,
therefore, had an obligation under both U.R.C.P. 58A and Rule 4-504(4) to provide
notice of entry of order. It will also be shown that regardless of their status as a
prevailing party, Defendants assumed the obligations set forth in Rule 4-504(4) to
provide notice of entry of order and file proof of service. Because Defendants had failed
to comply with the rules, relief from judgment was warranted.
The District Court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs relief. Plaintiffs'
Motion was timely and properly brought under U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7). Further, compelling
grounds existed justifying the relief sought in light of Defendants' failure to provide
notice of entry of order and the specific request by Plaintiffs' counsel for such notice.
Finally, substantial justice and equity demand that Defendants not derive a benefit from
their own failure to follow applicable rules.

3

Because the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion without a memorandum decision and
adopted the Defendants' reasoning, Plaintiffs will refer to Defendants' arguments with
the understanding that they were the grounds for the Court's decision.
7

On appeal, Plaintiffs seek reversal of the District Court's decision denying them
relief from the Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice which was entered in the matter on
September 16, 1991, but which, through the failure of Defendants to comply with the
applicable procedural rules, deprived Plaintiffs of actual notice of the entry of the Order
until after November 24, 1992. Each of Defendants' arguments against granting the
relief Plaintiffs' requested and the District Court's adoption thereof, are clearly erroneous
and not properly founded.4
VII. ARGUMENT
A.

DEFENDANTS FAILED TO PROVIDE NOTICE OF ENTRY OF
ORDER AND FILE PROOF OF SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY RULE
58A OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RULE 4504(4) OF THE UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.
It is undisputed in the record below that Defendants did not provide notice of

entry of order to Plaintiffs. Proof of such notice is made by filing proof of service with
the Court. The record below shows that no proof of service was filed. See supra
Statement of Facts, no. 11. The initial question to be resolved by this Court is whether
Defendants were required to provide notice of entry of order and file proof of service
with the Court under U.R.C.P. 58A and/or Rule 4-504(4).

4

Additionally, the district court made no findings. The judgment should "follow
logically from and be supported by the evidence." The judgment "should be sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah
1987).
8

1.

Utah R. Civ. P. 58A Required Defendants to Provide Notice of
Entry of Order and File Proof of Service.

Defendants argued below that the notice requirement of U.R.C.P. 58A did not
apply because they were not "prevailing parties" within the meaning of the rule. See CR.
162. Defendants' argument and the District Court's reliance thereon are contrary to law
and the facts of the case, constituting clear error and warranting reversal.
U.R.C.P. 58A(d) provides:
Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The prevailing party
shall promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment
to all other parties and shall file proof of service of such
notice with the clerk of the court. However, the time for
filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice
requirement of this provision.
A stipulation and order dismissing an action without prejudice constitutes a judgment of
the rendering court. Gardner v. A.H. Robbins Co., 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984).
Because the Stipulation and Order in this case is a "judgment", U.R.C.P. 58A applies.
Therefore, there must necessarily be a prevailing party, at least for purposes of the
obligation to provide notice of entry of order and file proof of service under the rule. In
most cases the prevailing party is determined by the facts and circumstances of the case.
Otherwise, the rule would be inapplicable to any matter in which the court did not
designate a prevailing party.
In this case, Defendants brought a Motion to Dismiss the case for Plaintiffs
failure to provide a non-resident cost bond. CR. 104-107. After discussions between
counsel, a stipulation for dismissal was agreed to. Defendants objective of obtaining a
dismissal by bringing the Motion to Dismiss was, therefore, realized. Defendants then

9

prepared the first stipulation and transmitted it to Plaintiffs for signature. Clearly,
Defendants assumed the position of a prevailing party in form and substance by bringing
the motion, obtaining a dismissal and presenting the Order to the Court. By "prevailing
on the main issue," Defendants were prevailing parties and required to provide notice of
entry of order and file proof of service pursuant to U.R.C.P. 58A. Cf. CR. 162. It is
undisputed that they failed to do so.
2.

Defendants Failed to Provide Notice of Entry of Order and
Proof of Service as Required by Rule 4-504(4) of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration.

Defendants argued below that, as with U.R.C.P. 58A, only a prevailing party is
required to provide notice of entry of order and proof of service under Rule 4-504(4) of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. This contention is unsupported by authority,
is contrary to the plain language of the rule and contravenes the basic policy behind
notice requirements. It would further be inequitable in view of Plaintiffs' request that
Defendants provide an executed copy of the order after it was signed by the judge.
Rule 4-504(4) provides:
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment
shall be served upon the opposing party and proof of such
service shall be filed with the court. All judgments, orders,
and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence
requiring a reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed
envelopes and pre-paid postage.
A stipulation and order dismissing an action without prejudice constitutes a judgment of
the rendering court. Gardner v. A.H. Robbins Co., 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984). In
this case there was a judgment entered. According to the rule, upon the entry of the
10

judgment notice shall be served on the opposing party. Defendants stated they were not
the prevailing party. As demonstrated above, they were the prevailing party.
Furthermore, a more logical reading of the more broadly worded Rule indicates that the
party who submits the order for signature, whether prevailing or not, must serve the
notice on the "opposing party". See 4-504(4). This reading is more consistent with the
language of the rule and common sense, i.e. the party causing the judgment to be
entered is the party responsible for giving notice of its entry to the opposing party.
Additionally, the Rule's language specifically deals with an "opposing party" rather
than the "prevailing party". The Rule was intended to encompass stipulations as well as
judgments on the merits. This is evidenced by the placement of subsection (4) after
subsection (2) and (3). Rule 4-504(4) applies to judgments regardless of whether they are
the result of a stipulation (4-504(3)) or a decision on the merits (4-504(2)). If the notice
requirements of 4-504(4) applied only to Rule 4-504(2), the rule would have specified
that 4-504(4) applied only to judgments under 4-504(2) instead of constituting a separate
subsection following (3) which deals specifically with stipulations.
Moreover, the policy underlying the adoption of the notice requirements of 4504(4) also supports a reading that the party undertaking the obligation of presenting the
order for signature must also provide notice of its entry and file proof of service with the
court. As the Court of Appeals stated in Workman v. Nagle Construction, 802 P.2d 749
(Utah App. 1990), stated, "the purpose and intended effect of the Utah and federal rules
are the same, namely, notice that a judgment has been entered." Additionally, the Utah
Supreme Court has indicated that the District Court Rules and Circuit Court Rules (now
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the Code of Judicial Administration) are supplemental to the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Bigelow v. Ingersoll. 618 P.2d 50, 52 (Utah 1980).
Therefore, whether technically a prevailing party or not, Defendants undertook
the obligation to present the Stipulation and Order to the Court for signature and entry.
Therefore, they were required by the Rule to provide notice of entry of order and file
proof of service with the Court. Defendants failed to do so. In light of their failure to
comply with the notice requirements of the Rule, Plaintiffs Motion for Relief must be
granted.
B.

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
REQUEST FOR RELIEF.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief requested that the September 16, 1991, Order be

deemed filed as of the day they acquired actual notice of the entry of order, namely,
November 24, 1992. Defendants, argued that Plaintiffs' Motion was actually an untimely
60(b)(1) motion founded upon attorney error, that no compelling grounds existed to
justify relief. The following will show that each of Defendants' arguments is clearly
erroneous and the District Court's reliance on them constitutes plain error and resulted
in an abuse of discretion.
1.

Defendants Failure to Provide Notice of Entry of Order
Deprived Plaintiffs of Notice and Justifies U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7)
Relief.

A request for relief from the operation of a stipulated judgment is properly
addressed by a Rule 60(b) motion. See Moore's Federal Practice, H60.27[2], and
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accompanying authority.5 Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
relevant part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: . . .
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered
or taken....
In this case Defendants' first argument for denying Plaintiffs' Motion was that Rule
60(b)(7) was inapplicable. Defendants' memorandum, adopted as the District Court's
reasoning, stated that Plaintiffs' Motion was based on "attorney inadvertence or neglect
and falls within Rule 60 (b)(1)". CR. 159. Defendants, thereafter, argued that failure of
Plaintiffs' counsel to request relief for over fourteen months was outside of the three
month limit imposed by U.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). Id. However, the neglect which caused the
fourteen month delay in requesting relief in this case was the result of the omission of
Defendants' counsel in failing to provide notice of entry of order rather than any alleged
neglect on the part of Plaintiffs' counsel for failing to receive the notice of entry of the
order.
Furthermore, even assuming Defendants were under no obligation to provide
notice of entry or proof of service, the failure of an attorney to act is seen by federal

5

In the absence of controlling state court decisions, the courts of this State will look
to federal decisions addressing similar rules of civil procedure for guidance. Winegar v.
Slim Olson. Inc.. 252 P.2d 205 (Utah 1953).
13

courts as coming within the "any other reason" provisions of Federal Rule 60(b)(6), which
is identical to Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules, and must be brought within a reasonable
time. See Moore's Federal Practice. 1160-286, at n.41, 42. Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief
was, therefore, properly grounded in U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7).
2.

Compelling Grounds Existed for Relief from the Judgment or
Order.

Defendants' failure to file and serve the required notices, as aforesaid, has been
prejudicial to Plaintiffs. The Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice operated to trigger
U.C.A. §78-12-40, giving Plaintiffs one year from the date of the "failure" of their action
to refile. The purpose of this law is to permit potentially valid suits to be heard which
may otherwise be barred if they are dismissed without prejudice after the applicable
statute of limitations has run. Marsden v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988).
Under the September 16, 1991, Order, the one year refiling period expired on
September 16, 1992. However, Plaintiffs did not even discover that the Order of
Dismissal Without Prejudice dated September 16, 1991, had been entered until after
November 24, 1992. Defendants' failure to provide Plaintiffs with the required notice
served to hinder refiling of a Complaint by the widow and minor son of David W.
Rounds of their action until after the period provided by said statute expired. The
prejudice of being deprived of their action is self-evident.
It is a rule of equity that a party not be allowed to benefit from his own improper
or dilatory conduct or that of his legal counsel. See Dutton v. Rocky Mountain
Phosphates, 438 P.2d 674 (Mont. 1968); 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity, §§138 & 147. Here, if
Defendants are allowed to avoid their duty to provide notice as required by the Rules
14

and thereby derive a benefit by preventing the opposing party from having his day in
court, justice will be circumvented. Equity demands that Defendants' conduct not be
rewarded. As the Court in Dutton, stated:
Relief will be granted when, in view of all the circumstances,
to deny it would permit one of the parties to suffer a gross
wrong at the hands of the other party who brought about the
condition.
Dutton, 438 P.2d at 684.
The District Court's failure to grant Plaintiffs the relief requested improperly permitted
Defendants to derive a benefit from their improper actions thereby constituting an abuse
of discretion and warranting reversal.
3.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief was Timely Presented Pursuant
to U.RA.P. 60(b)(7).

The Utah Court of Appeals in Workman v. Nagle Construction, 802 P.2d 749
(Utah App. 1990), stated that "if a losing party has remained ignorant of a judgment in
part because the prevailing party has not complied with Rule 58A(d), the resulting delay
is more reasonable for purposes of Rule 60(b)(5) through (7).,f Id. at 250. The
Workman Court further held that the defendant's 60(b) motion was timely because the
motion for relief was brought approximately one month after discovery of the entry of
the order. Id. Finally, the Court stated, "while noncompliance with those rules does not
bring about automatic invalidity of an entered judgment, it is a weighty factor in
determining the timeliness of later challenges to the judgment under Utah R. Civ. P.
60(b)(5)-(7)." Workman. 802 P.2d at 750.

15

In this case, as in Workman, Plaintiffs were not served with any notice of entry of
order. See supra Statement of Facts no. 11. Moreover, Plaintiffs' Motion was brought
within two months after actual discovery of entry of the Order, on January 15, 1993.
Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order was properly and timely
before the Court for consideration pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7). The Court's holding
to the contrary constitutes clear error and warrants reversal.
C.

THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS
RELIEF BECAUSE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ORDER
WAS TOLLED UNTIL PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED ACTUAL
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF THE ORDER.

The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that the rules requiring the prevailing party
to provide notice of entry pursuant to Rule 58A(d) or Rule 4-504 are not "inert
desiderata" although the judgment is nonetheless "effective". Workman, 802 P.2d at 752.
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of failure to provide notice of entry of
order only once, finding harmless error had occurred. Mountain States Tel. & Tel, v.
Sohm, 755 P.2d 155, 157 (Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has, however, stated of
the earlier procedural rules:
Practical considerations and fairness in appellate
procedure support this conclusion. Prior to promulgation of
Rule 2.9(b), counsel were obliged to constantly check with the
court clerk to determine whether a judgment had been filed.
On occasion, because of the press of other business and the
lack of notice, filing dates were missed and what may have
been meritorious appeals, dismissed. The District Court and
Circuit Court Rules were designed in part to obviate this
problem. Proper effectuation of both rules requires that Rule
2.9(b) of the District and Circuit Court Rules be read
together with Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Bigelow v. Ingersoll 618 P.2d 50, 52-53 (Utah 1980).
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Under Rule 5 8A, the only time period which is not specifically tolled pending
receipt of notice of entry of an order is the period for filing a notice of appeal. U.R.C.P.
58A(d). This express reservation indicates, by negative implication, that a failure to
provide notice of entry of judgment or order will toll the accrual of effective date of the
Judgment for other purposes. Otherwise, Rule 58A(d) would simply have provided that
no periods are tolled pending filing and service of notice of entry of order. Interestingly,
if no periods were tolled pending filing and service of notice of entry, Rule 58A(d) and
Rule 4-504(4) would, in fact, be inert desiderata and have no meaning whatsoever. Cf.
Workman, at 750. Finally, the Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504(4), does not
even carve out the notice of appeal exception provided by Rule 58A(d), further
indicating that tolling of the effective date of the Order is proper until notice thereof is
provided to the opposing party.
Justice requires that the Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice be deemed entered
as of the date Plaintiffs discovered that it had been entered. Giving this effect to the
Order would preclude Defendants from benefiting from their failure to comply with the
Rules and, at the same time, would preserve the effectiveness of the Order. Cf.
Workman, 803 P.2d at 750. In the alternative, the Order should be vacated and set aside
altogether.
The fact that notice of entry of order was neither filed nor served herein, as
required by the Rules, is undisputed. That prejudice has resulted from Defendants'
omission is also uncontestable. As the Bigelow Court noted, prior to promulgation of the
Rules:
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. . . counsel were obliged to constantly check with the court
clerk to determine whether a judgment had been filed. On
occasion, because of the press of other business and the lack
of notice, filing dates were missed and what may have been
meritorious appeals, dismissed. The District Court and
Circuit Court Rules were designed in part to obviate this
problem. . . .
The District Court erred in its application of the Rules to the facts of this case,
warranting reversal of the Court's Order denying Plaintiffs relief.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs seek relief from the Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice which was
entered on September 16, 1991, but which they did not discover was entered until after
November 24, 1992. They have demonstrated that Defendants failed to provide notice of
entry of Order as required by the Rules and as requested by Plaintiffs' counsel, nor did
they file proof of service with the court. Plaintiffs have shown that their Motion for
Relief From Judgment or Order was timely and that compelling grounds existed justifying
the relief requested. Plaintiffs have further shown that the effectiveness of the judgment
can be preserved while affording the requested relief. Finally, justice requires
Defendants not be permitted to benefit from their failure to comply with the applicable
Rules.
The District Court clearly abused its discretion by denying Plaintiffs' request for
relief in light of Defendants' failure to observe the applicable rules and the other facts
favoring the relief requested. Plaintiffs should be given relief from the Order of
Dismissal Without Prejudice in the form of an order declaring that said Order be set
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aside or, alternatively, that it be deemed entered as of the date Plaintiffs actually became
aware of its entry.
Respectfully submitted this_26jHday of July, 1993.

ROBERTT.X)RTONf #A£483
MILO a MARSDEN,\IR/- #2086
MARSDEN^ORTON, CAHOON &
GOTTFREDSON
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
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MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON
68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800
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attached BRIEF OF APPELLANTS upon the following counsel for the
Defendants/Appellees in this matter by mailing it to them by first class mail with
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Attorney for Defendant, State of Utah
Department of Transportation
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September 4, 1991

Reed M. Stringham III
Assistant Attorney General
Litigation Division
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

Rounds vs. State of Utah and Utah
Department of Transportation

Dear Reed:
I am enclosing a revised Stipulation and Order of Dismissal
Without Prejudice.
If you are in agreement with the changes,
please present the Order to the Court for signing and entry and
provide me with an executed copy thereof.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Very truly yours

ROBERT F. ORTON
RFO:kdm
Enclosure

OOOIJO

JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
REED M. STRINGHAM - 4679
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JANICE ROUNDS and DYLAN
ROUNDS,

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM
OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR
ORDER

Plaintiffs,

STATE OF UTAH, and UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendants.

Civil No. 900902566PI
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

This is the memorandum of defendants State of Utah and
Utah Department of Transportation (collectively "UDOT") opposing
plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment or order.
FACTS
In addition to the facts submitted by plaintiffs, UDOT
submits the following:
1.

On June 20 and 21, 1991 respectively, counsel for

UDOT filed two motions: a motion to compel plaintiffs to provide
sufficient answers to interrogatories that had been served on

r\ i\

r\

August 20, 1990; and a motion to dismiss without prejudice
because plaintiffs failed to file the undertaking required by
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19. Affidavit of Reed Stringham.
2.

Plaintiffs did not respond to the motions, so on

July 15, 1991 the motions were submitted for decision.
3.

Id.

On or about July 18, 1991, UDOT's counsel agreed to

allow plaintiffs until August 15, 1991 to respond to the motions.
Id.
4.

Sometime after August 15, 1991 but before September

3, 1991, plaintiffs' counsel called UDOT's counsel and said that
plaintiffs would stipulate to dismissal without prejudice if UDOT
would withdraw its motion to compel.

UDOT's counsel agreed,

prepared a stipulation and order and had it delivered to
plaintiffs' counsel on September 3, 1991 for approval. A copy of
the proposed stipulation is contained at Exhibit A to the
Affidavit of Robert F. Orton in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Relief From Judgment or Order.
5.

Id.

On September 6, 1991, UDOT's counsel received in

the mail from plaintiffs' counsel a court paper titled
"Stipulation and Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice."
counsel reviewed it and signed it on that day.
6.

UDOT's

Id.

The substance of the stipulation and order prepared

by plaintiffs' counsel is identical to one proposed earlier by
UDOT's counsel. UDOT's proposed stipulation and order states:

2
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STIPULATION
The parties, through their respective counsel,
stipulate that this action be dismissed without prejudice, each
party to bear their own costs, and that defendant's motion to
compel be withdrawn.
ORDER
Based on the stipulation of the parties, and good cause
appearing therefor, this action is dismissed without prejudice,
each party to bear their own costs, and defendant's motion to
compel is withdrawn.
The stipulation and order prepared by plaintiffs'
counsel states:
STIPULATION
The parties, through their respective counsel,
stipulate and agree:
1. That Defendants' Motion to Dismiss may be granted
provided that the dismissal shall not be on the merits and shall
be without prejudice.
2.

That Defendants' Motion to Compel may be withdrawn.

3.

That the parties shall bear their own costs of

suit.
ORDER
Based on the Stipulation of the parties, and good cause
appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. That Defendants' Motion to Compel be and the same
is hereby ordered withdrawn.
2. That Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be and th
ame
is hereby granted and Plaintiffs' Complaint be and is hereby
dismissed; provided, however, that said dismissal is not a
dismissal on the merits and is without prejudice.
3.

That the parties bear their own costs of suit.

See Exhibits to Orton's Affidavit.
7.

After signing the stipulation, UDOT's counsel
3
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handed it to his secretary and told her to send the original to
the court and to mail a copy of it to plaintiff's counsel.
Stringham Affidavit.
8.

It is not known whether a copy was mailed to

plaintiff's counsel.

UDOT's counsel did not follow up with his

secretary to make sure she sent a copy to plaintiff's counsel.
However, it has been UDOT's counsel's experience that his
secretary follows his instructions and mails papers that he asks
her to mail.
9.

Id.
Plaintiffs did not conduct any discovery from the

filing of the lawsuit until the dismissal of the action on
September 16, 1991.

Plaintiffs did not thereafter attempt to

prosecute the case.

Id.

PLAINTIFFS1 BURDEN OF PROOF
Plaintiffs have moved for relief from judgment pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(7), Utah R. Civ. P.

The rule gives the court

discretionary authority to relieve a party from a final judgment
for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment."

Id.

In order to prevail on a Rule 60(b)(7) motion, a

party must demonstrate the following:
1.

the reason for relief must be one other than those
listed in Rule 60(b)(1) - (6);

2.

the reason justifies relief from judgment;

3.

the motion is made in a reasonable time.

Laub v. South Central Utah Tel. Ass'n.. 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah
1982) .

4
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ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION DOES NOT
SATISFY RULE 60(b)(7)
Plaintiffs cannot establish the elements of a motion
under Rule 60(b)(7).

Their proferred reason for relief, that

they did not receive notice of the judgment, is based if anything
on attorney inadvertence or neglect and falls within Rule
60(b)(1).

Moreover, the reason does not justify relief from

judgment because plaintiffs' counsel, having drafted the
stipulation and order of dismissal, fully intended it to be
signed and entered.

There can be no claim of prejudice when

plaintiffs did nothing for over fourteen months to attempt to
prosecute the case or inquire as to the status of the order their
attorney drafted.

Finally, plaintiffs' sixteen month delay in

bringing the motion for relief is not reasonable.
A.

Proffered Justification Falls Within Rule 60(b)(1)
Rule 60(b)(1) permits relief from judgment where there

is "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect."

Where

attorney neglect is the proffered reason for relief, Utah's
appeals courts apply Rule 60(b)(1).

See Annotations to Rule

60(b)(1) in Utah Court Rules Ann. pp. 197, 201-202 (1992).
Federal courts also have "frequently" held that cases of attorney
neglect fall within the identical Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) rather
than the federal version of Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(7).

C. Wright

& A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2864 p. 222 (1973).
In the present case, plaintiffs received tardy notice
of the dismissal as a result of attorney neglect.

Plaintiffs'

5
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counsel drafted the stipulation and order for dismissal and
approved the order as to form.

He sent it to defense counsel in

September 1991 with the intent that it would be signed and
entered.

When he did not hear from defense counsel, plaintiffs'

attorney made no inquiry.

He did nothing in the case for the

next fourteen months until November, 1992 when, upon inquiry by
plaintiffs, he investigated and discovered that the order of
dismissal had been entered on September 16, 1991.

This is

neglect, if anything, and falls within Rule 60(b)(1).
"any other reason justifying relief."

It is not

Plaintiffs cannot

establish the first element of their motion.
B.

Reason Does Not Justify Relief
Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to relief

because they did not receive notice of the dismissal.

According

to them, UDOT was required by local Rule 4-504(2) to provide a
copy of the proposed judgment to plaintiffs prior to its
presentment to the court. Also according to plaintiffs, UDOT was
required to provide notice of entry of judgment pursuant to Rule
4-504(4), C.J.A., and Rule 58A, Utah R. Civ. P.

Since

plaintiffs' counsel never received either notice, they conclude
that the judgment was never filed and is therefore invalid.
Plaintiffs' argument errs because Rule 4-504(2) does
not apply.

It governs the procedure for submitting orders based

on judicial determinations of disputed issues. A different rule
applies where there is a stipulated dismissal.

Rule 4-504(3)

states:
6
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(3) Stipulated settlements and
dismissals shall also be reduced in writing
and presented to the court for signature
within fifteen days of the settlement and
dismissal.
The rule does not say anything about serving a stipulation before
presentment to the court.

Thus, UDOT was not required by local

rule to send a copy of the stipulation back to plaintiffs'
counsel.
The reason for a different local rule for stipulated
dismissals is clear.

Parties to a stipulation are both fully

aware of what is occurring in their case, each having reached an
agreement and having executed the stipulation.

There is no need

for further notice to a party who has drafted and signed a
stipulation and approved an order as to form, especially when
there is no question that the stipulation will be signed because
its substance is identical to one previously drafted by the
opposing party.

In this case, therefore, plaintiffs received

sufficient notice of the stipulation and order before it was
presented to the court.
The decision in Biaelow \
(Utah 1980) is not to the contrary.

Inaersoll. 618 P.2d 580
In Biaelow the court held

that an opposing party must be served with a copy of a proposed
order before it is presented to the judge.

The purpose of th 3

rule is to notify the opposing party that a judgment has been
filed.

However, Biaelow involved a judicial determination of

disputed issues rather than a stipulated dismissal.

The

controlling local rule in Bigelow simply does not apply here
7
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because in this case there is no rule requiring service of a
stipulated order of dismissal prior to presentment to the court.
Plaintiffs here had adequate notice, as demonstrated above, so
Biaelow is distinguishable.
Plaintiffs also incorrectly contend that the judgment
is invalid because they did not receive notice of entry of
judgment. Rule 58A(d) requires "prevailing parties" to give
notice.

A prevailing party is one who "successfully prosecutes

the action or successfully defends against it, prevailing on the
main issue."

Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951).

Since the

stipulation in the present case was for dismissal without
prejudice, defendants are not prevailing parties and had no
obligation under the rules to give notice.

In any event, Utah

Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs' argument in Workman v.
Nacrle Construction Co.. 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990) . In Nacrle.
the plaintiff did not give notice of entry of judgment and the
defendants argued that this omission invalidated the judgment.
The court rejected the argument holding that "[njotice to the
parties of the entry of judgment was therefore not a prerequisite
to its effectiveness."

Ic|. at 751.

Additionally, Rule 4-504(4) does not help plaintiffs'
cause.

The rule requires that notice of entry of judgment be

served on "the opposing party."
to serve notice.

However, it does not say who is

Given that omission, it is logical to assume

that the "prevailing party" has the obligation as required by
Rule 58A.

UDOT is not a prevailing party, as shown above, and
8
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therefore has no obligation to give notice.
Finally, plaintiffs wrongly suggest that they are
unfairly prejudiced.

It was plaintiffs who initially proposed a

dismissal and had their attorney draft a stipulation and order to
that effect.

Their attorney signed the stipulation, approved it

as to form and sent it to defense counsel for his signature.
Since the proposed stipulation was substantively identical to one
that UDOT proposed earlier, it is no surprise that UDOT agreed to
it.

UDOT's counsel then instructed his secretary to send an

executed copy to plaintiff's counsel, but he never received it.
Nevertheless, instead of asking abut the stipulation or
attempting to prosecute the case, plaintiffs did nothing for the
next fourteen months.

It is unreasonable for plaintiffs to claim

unfair prejudice on these facts.

They certainly did not wait

fourteen months expecting UDOT's counsel to respond to the
proposed stipulation.

Rather, they simply failed to follow

through on a matter they set in motion.
announced by the Tenth Circuit

The Rule 60(b) policy

Court of Appeals in Binder

Robinson & Co. v. U.S.S.C.C, 748 F.2d 1415, 1421 (10th Cir.
1984) is equally applicable here:
Keeping the suit alive merely because the
plaintiff should not be penalized for the
omissions of his own attorney would be
visiting the sins of the plaintiff's lawyer
upon the defendant. (emphasis original)
(quoting Link v. Wabash Railroad. 370 U.S. 626, 634 n. 10
(1962) .)

9
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C.

Unreasonable Period of Time
Plaintiffs cannot establish that their motion for

relief is made within a reasonable time.
events leading to the dismissal.

They set in motion the

They had an entire year to

inquire about the stipulation and did nothing.

If they had

attempted to prosecute the action during that year they would
have learned of the dismissal.

The fact that they did not get an

executed copy of the stipulation and order is unfortunate, but
that is not an important factor because the requirements of the
local rules and Rule 58A, Utah R. Civ. P., do not apply to
stipulated dismissals.

Therefore, plaintiffs' motion for relief

from judgment is not filed in a reasonable time.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the requirements of Rule
60(b)(7).

Their motion for relief from judgment should be

denied.
DATED this 2.-7

day of January, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

REED M. STRDjttGHAM III
Assistant Attorney General
Litigation Division
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER, this J?

day of

January, 1993, to the following:
Robert F. Orton
Milo S. Marsden
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET
FIFTH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
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JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
REED M. STRINGHAM - 4679
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016

v^

~*>

uO
^» *

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JANICE ROUNDS, and DYLAN
ROUNDS,

:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF REED M.
STRINGHAM

Plaintiffs,
v.

:

STATE OF UTAH, and UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

:
:
:

Civil No. 900902566 PI

:

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

)
:ss
)

Reed Stringham being sworn states:
1.
action.

I am the attorney for the defendants in this

I have personal knowledge of the facts in this affidavit

and am competent to testify to them.
2.

On June 20 and 21, 1991 respectively, I filed on

behalf of defendants two motions: a motion to compel plaintiffs
to provide sufficient answers to interrogatories that had been
served on August 20, 1990; and a motion to dismiss without
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prejudice because plaintiffs failed to file the undertaking
required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19.
3.

Plaintiffs did not respond to the motions, so on

July 15, 1991 the motions were submitted for decision.
4.

On or about July 18, 1991 I agreed to allow

plaintiffs until August 15, 1991 to respond to the motions.
5.

Sometime after August 15, 1991 but before September

3, 1991, plaintiffs' counsel called me and said that plaintiffs
would stipulate to dismissal without prejudice if defendants
would withdraw their motion to compel.

I agreed, prepared a

stipulation and order and had it delivered to plaintiffs' counsel
on September 3, 1991 for his approval. A copy of the proposed
stipulation is contained at Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Robert
F. Orton m

Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief From

Judgment or Order.
6.

On September 6, 1991, I received in the mail from

plaintiffs' counsel a court paper titled "Stipulation and Order
of Dismissal Without Prejudice.11

I reviewed it and signed it on

that day.
7.

After signing the stipulation I handed it to my

secretary and told her to send the original to the court and to
mail a copy of it to plaintiffs' counsel.
8.

I do not know whether a copy was mailed to

plaintiffs' counsel.

I did not follow up with my secretary to

make sure she sent a copy to plaintiffs' counsel.

However, it

has been my experience that my secretary follows my instructions
and mails papers that I ask her to mail.
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9.

Plaintiffs did not conduct any discovery from the

filing of the lawsuit until the dismissal of the action on
September 16, 1991.

Plaintiffs did not attempt to move the case

forward after that date.
DATED this

^ <** day of January, 1993.

REED M. STRIN9HAM III
Assistant Attorney General
Litigation Division
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this *?£

day of

January, 1993.
Notary Public
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF REED STRINGHAM, this

c?7

day of

January, 1993, to the following:
Robert F. Orton
Milo S. Marsden
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON
68 South Main Street
Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City# Utah 84101
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
ROUNDS, JANICE
PLAINTIFF

VS
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH DEPT OF TRANSPO DEFENDANT

CASE NUMBER 900902566 PI
DATE 02/22/93
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK CLB

TYPE OF HEARINGS
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 19, 1993, THE
COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS:
1. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, ETC. IS
DENIED, FOR THE REASONS STATED IN DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION.
2. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT TO PREPARE THE APPROPRIATE
ORDER.
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r.3 9 1393
A SALTJ^KE COUNTY

JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
REED M. STRINGHAM - 4679
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for State of Utah
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1650
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JANICE ROUNDS and DYLAN
ROUNDS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF UTAH, and UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANS PORTATION,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

Civil No. 900902566PI
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

:

Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment or
Order.

The parties filed supporting and opposing memoranda and

affidavits and the motion was submitted for decision on February
19, 1993. The Court denied the motion for the reasons stated in
its February 22, 1993 Minute Entry.
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IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from
Judgment is denied.
DATED this

.. /
4 4 ^ day of E«JM=»etty, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

UOmlU&LEjJ J DENNIS FREDERICK
D^scTictr~ccAirt Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
Of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT,
this <PB

day of February, 1993, to the following:
Robert F. Orton
Milo S. Marsden
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET
FIFTH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
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